We offer a parsimonious definition of large population potential games, provide some alternate characterizations, and demonstrate the advantages of the new definition over the existing definition, but also show the equivalence of the two definitions.
Introduction
Potential games admit a variety of practical applications and possess appealing theoretical properties, most notably the convergence of myopic adjustment processes to Nash equilibrium. Sandholm (2001) , building on the work of Beckmann et al. (1956) , Monderer and Shapley (1996) , and Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988) , defines and analyzes potential games in settings with large populations of anonymous agents.
In this paper, we provide a new definition of potential games for these large population settings. At first glance it may seem that the definition proposed here is more general but more complicated than the one from Sandholm (2001) ; however, we show that if population sizes are fixed, the two definitions are equivalent. Equally importantly, the new definition is both more parsimonious and easier to verify than the old one: while under the old definition, checking whether a game is a potential game requires constructing extended payoff functions that satisfy certain properties, the new definition can be verified directly.
While our analysis allows for multiple populations (i.e., multiple player roles), it is easier to describe the main ideas informally by focusing on the single population case. In this setting, an n-strategy population game is defined by a vector of payoff functions F = (F 1 , . . . , F n ) defined on the set of population states-that is, the simplex X in R n .
In Sandholm (2001) , potential games are defined using standard concepts from multivariable calculus. A population game F is called a potential game if there is a scalar-valued function f , the potential function, whose gradient always equals the vector of payoffs; put differently, the payoff to strategy i must always be given by the ith partial derivative of f . By standard results, F is a potential game in this sense if and only if its derivative matrices DF(x) are symmetric, so that corresponding cross partial derivatives of F are equal.
Because the statements above involve partial derivatives, they only make sense if the relevant functions are defined on a full-dimensional subset of R n -for instance, on the positive orthant R n + . In particular, checking the symmetry of the derivative matrix DF(x) requires us to extend the payoff functions from the simplex X to the orthant R n + . Since points outside the simplex are not population states, extending payoffs in this way is not parsimonious. Worse still, this approach makes it difficult to decide whether a given population game is a potential game. Even if the extensions one has checked do not satisfy the symmetry condition, an extension that one has not checked may do so. Simple examples in Sections 3 and 4 show that this possibility is real.
We therefore offer a definition of potential games that does not require such extensions: payoffs and potential need only be defined on the simplex. Later on, in Theorem 4.3, we characterize potential games using a derivative symmetry condition, but one that continues to make sense when payoffs are only defined on the simplex.
From a game theoretic point of view, the key difference between the new and old definitions is this: While under the old definition, the gradient ∇ f completely describes payoffs under F, under the new definition, the gradient need only describe relative payoffs under F-in other words, differences between the payoffs of pairs of strategies. In this sense, the new definition accords more closely with that of Monderer and Shapley (1996) , as their normal form potential games are defined by the property that differences in payoffs are captured by differences in potential.
The new definition and characterization employ the orthogonal projection Φ. When applied to a payoff vector π, Φ returns the demeaned version of that vector, so that Φπ only retains information about relative payoffs. Using Φ in the definition of potential games is an uncomplicated way of ensuring that only relative payoffs are regulated by the definition.
What is the link between the old and new definitions of large population potential games? Surprisingly, Theorem 4.1 shows that the two definitions are equivalent: given a payoff function F and potential function f defined on the simplex, there is always an extension of these functions to R n + that satisfies the definition of potential games from Sandholm (2001) . In particular, the information about payoffs not initially captured by f -namely, information about average payoffs-can always be incorporated into the extension of f . This result tells us that the old definition of potential games does not entail a loss of generality. But the new approach is superior: since it does not require extensions, it allows us to decide whether a population game is a potential game in a systematic way.
Section 2 introduces population games. Section 3 reviews the definition of potential games from Sandholm (2001) , explains the inadequacies of this definition, and proposes a new one. Section 4 relates the old and new definitions, and also describes situations in which the old definition is more useful than the new one.
Games Played by Large Populations

Population Games
Let P = {1, ..., p} be a society consisting of p ≥ 1 populations of agents. Agents in population p form a continuum of mass m p > 0.
The set of strategies available to agents in population p is denoted S p = {1, . . . , n p }, and has typical elements i, j, and (in the context of normal form games) s p . We let n = p∈P n p equal the total number of pure strategies in all populations. During game play, each agent in population p selects a strategy from S p . The set of population states (or strategy distributions) for population p is thus
∈ R + represents the mass of players in population p choosing strategy i ∈ S p . Elements of X = p∈P X p = {x = (x 1 , . . . , x p ) ∈ R n + : x p ∈ X p }, the set of social states, describe behavior in all p populations at once.
We generally take the sets of populations and strategies as fixed and identify a game with its payoff function. A payoff function F: X → R n is a continuous map that assigns each social state a vector of payoffs, one for each strategy in each population. F p i
: X → R denotes the payoff function for strategy i ∈ S p , while F p : X → R n p denotes the payoff functions for all strategies in S p . When p = 1, we omit the redundant superscript p from all of our notation.
Example 2.1. Random matching in normal form games. A p-player normal form game is defined by a strategy set S p = {1, . . . , n p } and a utility function U p : S → R for each player p ∈ P = {1, ..., p}, p ≥ 2. The domain of U p is the set of pure strategy profiles S = q∈P S q .
Suppose that agents from p unit-mass populations are randomly matched to play the normal form game U = (U 1 , . . . , U p ), with one agent from each population q being drawn to serve in player role q. Then the probability that an agent from population p is matched with opponents who jointly play strategy profile s −p ∈ S −p = r p S r is r p x r s r . The population game defined by this random matching procedure therefore has the multilinear payoff function
Full Population Games
In searching for interesting properties of population games, it seems natural to consider the marginal effect of adding new agents choosing strategy j ∈ S q on the payoffs of agents currently choosing strategy i ∈ S p . This effect is captured by the partial derivative
is only defined on X, the payoffs that would arise were newcomers to enter the population are not defined. For this reason, even if F p i is differentiable (in a sense to be made explicit below), its partial derivatives do not exist.
To ensure that partial derivatives exist, we can extend the domain of payoff functions from the state space
= m p } to the entire positive orthant R n + . We call the resulting gameF : R n + → R n a full-dimensional population game, or simply a full population game.
As suggested above, one can sometimes interpret this extended definition of payoffs as describing the values that payoffs would take were the population masses to change. For instance, this interpretation is the natural one in congestion games: here it makes sense to consider the effects of changing the number of drivers commuting between a certain origin/destination pair, and it is clear how one ought to define the payoffs at any newly feasible state x ∈ R n + − X.
1 But in other settings, there may be no one choice of extension that is obviously "correct" from a game-theoretic point of view.
Example 2.2. Random matching in normal form games revisited. Suppose we would like to define a full population game version of the random matching game (1). Many extensions of definition (1) from X to R n + are equally good in principle. But of these, the easiest to write down is the extension that retains the multilinear functional form from (1):
Large Population Potential Games
Full Potential Games
We can now present a definition of potential games used in Sandholm (2001) .
2
Definition. We call the full population gameF : R n + → R n a full potential game if there exists a continuously differentiable functionf :
Property (FP) can be stated more explicitly as
We call the functionf , which is unique up to an additive constant, the full potential function for the gameF. That payoffs are fully captured by the scalar-valued functionf is the source of full potential games' attractive properties. Nash equilibria ofF can be characterized in terms of Kuhn-Tucker conditions for maximizers off . Moreover, reasonable evolutionary dynamics-namely, dynamics in which strategies' growth rates are positively correlated with their payoffs-ascend potential, and therefore converge to sets of rest points from all initial conditions. Since under many dynamics the rest points are identical to the Nash equilibria ofF, this global convergence result provides a strong justification of the prediction of Nash equilibrium play.
Suppose thatF is continuously differentiable (C 1 ). Then by the standard integrability condition from multivariable calculus (see, e.g., Lang (1997) ),F is a full potential game if and only if it satisfies full externality symmetry:
More explicitly,F is a full potential game if and only if
q , p, q ∈ P , and x ∈ R n + .
2 Actually, while we suppose here that payoffs and potential are defined on R n + , in Sandholm (2001) we assumed that these were defined on the smaller setX
} for some ε > 0. As both of these domains are full-dimensional, they accomplish the same purpose.
Thus, full externality symmetry has a natural game-theoretic interpretation: the effect on the payoffs to strategy i ∈ S p of introducing new agents choosing strategy j ∈ S q must always equal the effect on the payoffs to strategy j of introducing new agents choosing strategy i.
An Example
The difficulties that the definition of full potential games allows are illustrated in the following example.
Example 3.1. Random matching in normal form potential games. The normal form game U is a potential game (Monderer and Shapley (1996) ) if there is a potential function V : S → R such that
In words, U is a potential game if any unilateral deviation has the same effect on the deviator's payoffs as it has on potential. Equivalently, U is a potential game if there is a potential function V and auxiliary functions W p :
for all s ∈ S and p ∈ P , so that each player's payoff is the sum of a common payoff term and a term that only depends on opponents' behavior.
Suppose that p populations of agents are randomly matched to play the normal form potential game U . The full population game we obtain from equation (2) is
where V and W p are the potential and auxiliary functions from equation (5).
Since the normal form game U admits a potential function, it seems natural to expect F to admit one as well. But if we compute the partial derivatives of payoffs, we find that If each W p is identically zero, so that U is a common interest game, then the partial derivatives above are equal, and soF is a full potential game. In this case, if we letf : R n + → R equal aggregate payoffs inF divided by p,
we find that
Thus, ∇f (x) =F(x) for all x ∈ R n + , and sof is a full potential function forF. §
This example seems to suggest that random matching in a normal form potential game does not generate a full potential game. But we will soon see that the example is misleading. While equation (6) is the only way to define the payoffs of the random matching game on the state space X, equation (6) implicitly uses extension (2) to define payoffs on the rest of R n + . Theorem 4.1 shows that by choosing the extension more carefully, one can ensure that conditions (FP) and (FES) are satisfied.
More fundamentally, Example 3.1 illustrates the difficulties inherent in definitions that require the existence of extensions satisfying certain properties. If we only know how payoffs must be defined on the state space X, it is not obvious how to determine whether an extension to R n + satisfying conditions like (FP) and (FES) exists: the fact that we have not found an extension satisfying these properties does not necessarily mean that no such extension exists.
The most parsimonious approach to this problem is to work directly with payoff and potential functions defined on the state space X. Since in this case partial derivatives of payoffs and potential are not defined, the usual definitions from multivariate calculus do not apply, and so must be replaced by notions of differentiation for functions defined on affine spaces. In geometric terms, this means that derivatives can only be evaluated with respect to directions tangent to X, which represent feasible changes in the social state. As we will see, the game theoretic consequence of this restriction is that potential functions defined on X only provide information about relative payoff levels.
Once this parsimonious analysis has been carried out, it is not difficult to introduce alternative definitions that use payoff extensions, and thus avoid affine calculus, but that do not cause the difficulties illustrated in the example above. We show how this is done in Section 3.4 and Corollary 4.6 below.
Derivatives and Tangent Spaces
We now introduce the definitions we need to proceed with the analysis proposed above. For a more thorough treatment of these ideas, see Akin (1990) .
The tangent space TX of the state space X is the smallest subspace of R n containing all directions of motion through X. One can verify that TX = p∈P TX p , where the set
= 0} is the tangent space of X p .
Let f : X → R be a scalar-valued function on X. Then f is differentiable at x ∈ X if there is a linear map D f (x) : TX → R, the derivative of f at x, satisfying
The gradient of f at x is the unique vector ∇ f (x) ∈ TX such that D f (x)z = ∇ f (x) z for all z ∈ TX. It is worth emphasizing that the uniqueness requirement here is with respect to the set TX. More generally, if v ∈ R n is any vector that represents D f (x) in the sense above, then ∇ f (x) = Φv, where the matrix Φ ∈ R n×n is the orthogonal projection of R n onto TX defined below. Analogous definitions apply to vector-valued functions on X. If F : X → R n is C 1 , its derivative at x ∈ X is a linear map from TX to R n ; while many matrices in R n×n can represent this derivative, applying the logic above to each component of F shows that there is a unique such matrix, the derivative matrix DF(x), whose rows are in TX.
A leading role in our analysis is played by the orthogonal projection onto TX p , represented by the symmetric matrix Φ ∈ R n p ×n p . This matrix can be written explicitly as
where I is the identity matrix and 1 ∈ R n p is the vector of ones. Since TX = p∈P TX p , it follows that the orthogonal projection onto TX is given by the block diagonal matrix
If π p ∈ R n p is a payoff vector for population p, then the projected payoff vector 
Potential Games
With these preliminaries in hand, we present our new definition.
Definition. Let F: X → R n be a population game. We call F a potential game if it admits a potential function: a C 1 function f : X → R that satisfies
Since the potential function f has domain X, the gradient vector ∇ f (x) is by definition an element of the tangent space TX. Condition (P) requires that this gradient vector always equal ΦF(x), the projection of the payoff vector F(x) onto TX. Put differently, the gradient of the potential function f must capture relative payoffs in F.
At the cost of sacrificing parsimony, one can avoid affine calculus by using a function defined throughout R n + to play the role of the potential function f . To do so, one simply includes the projection Φ on both sides of the analogue of equation (P). Φ∇f (x) = ΦF(x) for all x ∈ X.
Conversely, if the population game F admits a functionf satisfying condition (8), then F is a potential game, and the restriction f =f X is a potential function for F.
This observation is immediate from the relevant definitions. In particular, iff and f agree on X, then for all x ∈ X the gradient vectors ∇f (x) and ∇ f (x) define identical linear operators on TX, implying that Φ∇f (x) = Φ∇ f (x). But since Φ∇ f (x) = ∇ f (x) by definition, it follows that Φ∇f (x) = ∇ f (x); this equality and definition (P) yield the result. Observation 3.2 can be restated in a way that uses simple differences rather than the orthogonal projection Φ.
3 Note that condition (8) is equivalent to the dual condition z ∇f (x) = z F(x) for all z ∈ TX and x ∈ X.
Since the set of vectors of the form e p j − e p i span the subspace TX, this condition is itself equivalent to
We therefore have
Proposition 3.3. Observation 3.2 remains true if condition (8) is replaced by condition (9).
For an application of this result, see Section 3.5 below.
We conclude with a representation of potential games and potential functions that uses multipopulation versions of conditions due to Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988, p. 243) . Let
≤ m p } denote the projection of X p ⊂ R n p onto R n p −1 , and let
) is a bijection from X p to X p , and
Proposition 3.4. Let F : X → R n be a population game, and define the function G :
Then F is a potential game with potential function f : X → R if and only if there exists a function g : X → R such that
When these statements are true, f and g are related by g(x ) = f (ψ(x )) + c.
Proof. Suppose first that F is a potential game with potential function f . Then defining g : X → R by g(x ) = f (ψ(x )), and letting e p i denote the (i, p)th standard basis vector in R n , we find that
so equation (11) holds. Conversely, suppose that G and g satisfy equation (11). If we define f : X → R by
As vectors of the form e p i − e p n p span TX, we conclude that F is a potential game with potential function f .
Example Revisited
For a first application of our new definition, we revisit random matching in normal form potential games (Example 3.2).
4
Let U be a normal form potential game with potential function V and auxiliary functions W p , and let F : X → R n be the corresponding population game:
This F is the restriction to X of the full potential gameF : R n + → R n from equation (6). If we define the functionf : R n + → R as in equation (7),
Therefore, by Proposition 3.3, F is a potential game with potential function f =f X . Conversely, let U be a normal form game, and let F : X → R be the corresponding population game as defined in equation (1). Since the payoffs to an agent in population p do not depend on the choices of other agents in population p, we can write
whenever it is convenient to do so.
Suppose that F is a potential game with potential function f : X → R as defined in equation (P) 
for all x ∈ X. Thus, letting ι p i denote the ith standard basis vector in R n p , and setting
. Fix a strategy s q ∈ S q for each player q p; then setting y q = ι q s q for each such q, we find that
Therefore, V is a potential function for U as defined in equation (4). In summary, we have established Proposition 3.5. Let U be a normal form game, and let F : X → R n be the population game generated by random matching in U. Then F is a potential game if and only if U is a potential game.
Characterizations of Large Population Potential Games
Creating Full Potential Games from Potential Games
What is the relationship between full potential games and potential games? Under the former definition, condition (FP) requires that payoffs be completely determined by the potential function, which is defined on R n + . Under the latter, condition (P) asks only that relative payoffs be determined by the potential function, now defined just on X.
To understand the relationship between the two definitions, take a potential game F : X → R n with potential function f : X → R as given, and extend f to a full potential functionf : R n + → R. Theorem 4.1 shows that the link between the full potential gamẽ F ≡ ∇f and the original game F depends on how the extensionf is chosen. Theorem 4.1. Let F : X → R n be a potential game with potential function f : X → R. Let f : R n + → R be any C 1 extension of f , and define the full potential gameF :
The population games F andF X have the same relative payoffs: ΦF(x) = ΦF(x) for all x ∈ X. (ii) One can choose the extensionf in such a way that F andF X are identical.
Part (i) of the theorem shows that the full potential gameF generated from an arbitrary extension of the potential function f exhibits the same relative payoffs as F on their common domain X. It follows that F andF have the same best response correspondences and Nash equilibria, but may exhibit different average payoff levels. Part (ii) of the theorem shows that by choosing the extensionf appropriately, we can makeF and F identical on X. To accomplish this, we construct the extensionf in such a way (equation (12) below) that its derivatives at states in X evaluated in directions orthogonal to TX encode information about average payoffs from the original game F.
In conclusion, Theorem 4.1(ii) demonstrates that if population masses are fixed, so that the relevant set of social states is X, then definition (FP), while more difficult to check, does not entail a loss of generality relative to definition (P).
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Part (i) follows from the fact that ΦF(x) = Φ∇f (x) = ∇ f (x) = ΦF(x) for all x ∈ X; compare the discussion following Observation 3.2.
To prove part (ii), we first extend f and F from the state space X to its affine hull aff(X) = {y = (y 1 , . . . , y p ) ∈ R n : i∈S p y p i = m p }. Letf : aff(X) → R be a C 1 extension of f : X → R, and letĝ p : aff(X) → R be a continuous extension of population p's average payoff function,
(The existence of these extensions follows from the Whitney Extension Theorem-see Krantz and Parks (1999) 
, thenF is a continuous extension of F, and ∇f (x) = ΦF(x) for all x ∈ aff(X).
With this groundwork complete, we can extend f to all of R n + via
where ξ(y) = Φy + z ⊥ TX is the closest point to y in aff(X). (Here, z ⊥ TX is the orthogonal translation vector that sends TX to aff(X): namely, (z
n p 1.) SinceF ≡ ∇f , the chain and product rules imply that
In particular, if x ∈ X , then ξ(x) = x, and soF(x) = F(x). This completes the proof of the theorem.
Example 4.2. Random matching in symmetric normal form potential games. If a single population of agents are randomly matched to play the symmetric two-player game U = (U 1 , U 2 ) = (A, A ), the resulting population game F : X → R n has payoff function F(x) = Ax.
If U is a normal form potential game, then any potential function V of U is a symmetric matrix. In fact, Sandholm (2008) shows that U is a potential game if and only if ΦAΦ is symmetric, and that in this case V = ΦAΦ+ΦA(I −Φ)+(I −Φ)A Φ is a potential function for U. If we define f : X → R by f (x) = 1 2
x Vx, then ∇ f (x) = ΦVx = ΦAx = ΦF(x) for all x ∈ X, so F is a potential game with potential function f . Moreover, if we definef :
(1 − 1 x)1, then the proof of Theorem 4.1 shows that ∇f (x) = F(x) for all x ∈ X, so thatf encodes all information about payoffs in F, not just information about relative payoffs.
For a simple example, suppose that
∇ f (x) = ΦF(x) = ΦAx for all x ∈ X, while applying equation (13) shows that
Differential Characterizations of Potential Games
Like full potential games, potential games can be characterized by a symmetry condition on the payoff derivatives DF(x). Theorem 4.3. Suppose that the population game F : X → R n is C 1 . Then F is a potential game if and only if it satisfies externality symmetry:
(ES) DF(x) is symmetric with respect to TX × TX for all x ∈ X.
Condition (ES) requires that at each state x ∈ X, the derivative DF(x) be a symmetric bilinear form on TX × TX. This condition can be stated more explicitly as (14) z DF(x)ẑ =ẑ DF(x)z for all z,ẑ ∈ TX and x ∈ X.
Proof of Theorem 4.3. To begin, suppose that F is a potential game with potential function f : X → R as in condition (P). This means that for all x ∈ X we have ∇ f (x) = ΦF(x), or, equivalently, that for all x ∈ X, ∇ f (x) = F(x) as linear forms on TX. Taking the derivative of each side of this identity with respect to directions in TX, we find that ∇ 2 f (x) = DF(x) as bilinear forms on TX × TX. But since ∇ 2 f (x) is a symmetric bilinear form on TX × TX (by virtue of being a second derivative-see Lang (1997, Theorem 17.5. 3)), DF(x) is as well. Next, suppose that F satisfies condition (ES). Define ξ : R n → aff(X) by ξ(y) = Φy+z ⊥ TX , as in the proof of Theorem 4.1. Let X = {y ∈ R n : ξ(y) ∈ X}, and define F : X → R n by
Then differentiating yields
By the standard integrability condition, F admits a potential function if and only if DF(y) is symmetric for all y ∈ X. Equation (15) tells us that the latter statement is true if and only if F satisfies condition (ES). Now let f be a potential function for F, and let f = f X . Then since ξ(x) = x for all x ∈ X, we find that
and so f is a potential function for F in the sense of condition (P). This completes the proof of the theorem.
Example 4.4. Two-strategy games. If F: X → R n is a two-strategy game (i.e., if p = 1, m = 1, and n = 2), the state space X is the simplex in R 2 , so the tangent space TX is spanned by the vector d = e 2 -e 1 . Thus, if z andẑ are vectors in TX, then z = kd andẑ =kd for some real numbers k andk. This implies that that z DF(x)ẑ = kk d DF(x) d =ẑ DF(x)z for all x ∈ X, and so that F is a potential game. Indeed, it is easy to verify that the function f : X → R defined by f (x 1 , 1 − x 1 ) = x 1 0 (F 1 (t, 1 − t) − F 2 (t, 1 − t)) dt is a potential function for F. While one can arrive at this f by an educated guess, one can also construct f from F mechanically using Proposition 3.4:
one-dimensional domain, and so is integrable; if we let g(x ) = 
The left hand side of equation (16) captures the change in the payoff to strategy j ∈ S p relative to strategy i ∈ S p as agents switch from strategy k ∈ S q to strategy l ∈ S q . This effect must equal the change in the payoff of l relative to k as agents switch from i to j, as expressed on the right hand side of (16). Evidently, this condition and its interpretation are akin to those of full externality symmetry (FES) (see equation (3) and the subsequent discussion); however, equation (16) only refers to relative payoffs and to feasible changes in the social state.
In the single population case, conditions (14) and (16) are equivalent to a condition introduced by Hofbauer (1985) (also see Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988, Theorem 24.4) ). While the three conditions are mathematically equivalent, condition (16) seems to admit the simplest game theoretic interpretation. Proposition 4.5. Suppose that F is a C 1 single population game (p = 1). Then F is a potential game if and only if it satisfies triangular integrability:
(x) = 0 for all i, j, k ∈ S and x ∈ X.
Proof. In the single population context, condition (16) can be written as (e j − e i ) DF(x) (e l − e k ) = (e l − e k ) DF(x) (e j − e i ) for all i, j, k, l ∈ S and x ∈ X.
The next example shows why condition (FP) is the appropriate definition of potential when entry and exit are allowed.
Example 4.7. A congestion model with (and without) entry and exit. Suppose that agents in a single unit-mass population select either an active strategy from the set S = {1, . . . , n} or the outside option, so that the set of population states is Y = {x ∈ R n + : i∈S x i ≤ 1}. Each active strategy i ∈ S has a C 1 payoff functionF i : Y → R of the form
where we write x T ≡ k∈S x k . The payoff to strategy i is thus the sum of two terms, one depending on the mass of agents playing strategy i, and the other on the total mass of active agents. By definition, the payoff to the outside option is identically zero. For the moment, assume that there is no entry or exit: that is, restrict the population state to the set X m = {x ∈ R n + : i∈S x i = m} ⊂ Y, where m ∈ (0, 1] represents the (fixed) mass of active players. In this case, differences between the payoffs of active strategies completely determine incentives, and so are enough to characterize equilibria and evolutionary dynamics. These payoff differences are precisely what is captured by a potential function f : X m → R satisfying condition (P): 6 ∇ f (x) = ΦF(x) for all x ∈ X m .
It is easy to verify that the game defined in equation (18) satisfies externality symmetry (ES) throughout the state space Y, and so admits a potential function on X m in the sense of condition (P). Indeed, such a function is given by (19) f ( If agents are free to choose the outside option, then understanding incentives requires us to know not only the relative payoffs of different active strategies, but also the absolute payoffs of each strategy, so that they can be compared to the the outside option payoff of zero. This requires a full potential functionf : Y → R, one that satisfies condition (FP):
∇f (x) =F(x) for all x ∈ Y.
Even if we extend its domain to Y in the obvious way, the potential function f from equation (19) is not a full potential function for the gameF from equation (18):
In fact, a full potential function for this game does not exist in general, sinceF violates condition (FES):
ButF does satisfy condition (FES) under additional assumptions. Suppose that v i ≡ v for all i ∈ S, so that the payoff to each active strategy depends on the number of active players in the same way. Then it is clear from equation (20) Since condition (FP), unlike condition (P), ensures that potential provides information about average payoffs, it leaves open the possibility of using potential functions to investigate efficiency. Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988, p. 240-241) and Sandholm (2001, Section 5) show that if the full potential functionf of a full potential gameF is homogeneous of positive degree, thenf is proportional to aggregate payoffs inF; 7 thus, since evolution increases potential, it increases aggregate payoffs as well. Of course, homogeneity is defined in terms of a function's behavior along rays from the origin, and so is not meaningful for functions defined only on X. Consequently, even in games without outside options, the full force of definition (FP) is needed to prove efficiency results.
